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Ashley Sharif* 
Dellinger v. Science Applications International 
Corporation: Missing an Opportunity to Expand 
the Meaning of “Employee” Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act 
In Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corp.,1 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided whether an applicant for 
employment is considered an “employee” and permitted to sue for retaliation2 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).3 The court held that because the FLSA’s 
anti-retaliation provision is a private civil action remedy for employees against their 
employers, the provision does not authorize prospective employees to bring claims 
against prospective employers.4 In reaching this result, the court narrowly defined 
the FLSA’s use of “employee” in the Act to exclude prospective employees.5 The 
court held that prospective employers do not hold the same duty toward 
prospective employees that current or previous employers hold for current or 
previous employees.6 In holding, the Fourth Circuit permitted the kind of 
retaliatory behavior that the FLSA was enacted to prevent.7 
The court should have found that the term “employee” is ambiguous, as used in 
the FLSA.8 Additionally, the court overlooked the fact that the anti-retaliation 
provisions of the FLSA state that it is unlawful for “any person,” not “any 
employer,” to retaliate against an employee who has filed an FLSA claim.9 Finally, 
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 1. Dellinger v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 
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 5. Id. 
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 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
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the court should have compared the retaliation provisions of the FLSA to similar 
remedial federal statutes that afford protection to prospective employees, like the 
plaintiff in Dellinger.10 The Dellinger court missed an opportunity to expand the 
meaning of “employee” in the FLSA to include prospective employees and to hold 
that the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA regulate the behaviors of all 
employers, including prospective employers. 
I. The Case 
In late July 2009, Natalie Dellinger, an administrative assistant, filed a claim against 
her employer, CACI, Inc., for violations of the minimum wage and overtime 
provisions of the FLSA.11 After filing the claim against CACI, Inc., Dellinger sought 
other employment and applied for an administrative support position at Science 
Applications International Corporation (Science Applications) at the Sherman Kent 
School of the CIA.12 The position required applicants to have security clearance.13 
Throughout Dellinger’s employment history, she had worked as an administrative 
assistant on various government contracts that also required security clearance.14 
Following an interview at Science Applications, Dellinger was offered the 
administrative support position on or about August 21, 2009.15 
Science Application’s offer was contingent on Dellinger’s ability to meet several 
requirements for employment.16 Dellinger had to successfully complete a drug test 
and complete several forms.17 Additionally, Dellinger’s offer of employment was 
contingent on the verification, crossover, and maintenance of her security clearance 
from CACI, Inc., including the completion and submission of a government 
document known as Standard Form 86.18 Standard Form 86 is a form used for 
national security positions, and it contains a variety of background information 
questions, including whether there are any non-criminal court actions to which the 
applicant ever was or currently is a party.19 In completing Standard Form 86, 
Dellinger disclosed that she had filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the 
 
 10. See infra Part IV.C. 
 11. Dellinger v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., No. 1:10CV25 (JCC), 2010 WL 1375263, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 
2, 2010), aff’d, 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 12. Dellinger, 2010 WL 1375263, at *1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. Dellinger received her most recent clearance in 2008 and 2009, while she was an employee of CACI, 
Inc.  Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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Eastern District of Virginia alleging FLSA violations against her former employer, 
CACI, Inc.20 
On August 24, 2009, Dellinger returned her signed employment offer letter, her 
completed Standard Form 86, and the other required documents to Science 
Applications.21 After receiving Dellinger’s materials, Science Applications withdrew 
its offer of employment.22 Dellinger then filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that Science Applications failed to 
employ Dellinger as retaliation against her for filing an FLSA claim against her 
previous employer, CACI, Inc.23 
Science Applications filed a motion to dismiss.24 In the motion to dismiss, 
Science Applications argued that Dellinger did not state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted because she was never an “employee” within the meaning of the 
FLSA.25 The district court granted Science Applications’s motion to dismiss and 
held that Dellinger was not an employee under the FLSA.26 
In its opinion, the district court looked at the statutory language of the FLSA.27 In 
the FLSA, “employee” is defined as “any individual employed by an employer.”28 In 
order for an individual to be “employed” by an “employer” she must be “suffer[ed] 
or permitt[ed] to work.”29 The court held that Dellinger was never permitted to 
work for Science Applications, thus she was not an “employee,” as defined by the 
FLSA.30 The court concluded that without reading beyond the plain meaning of the 
Act, a job applicant is not an employee within the FLSA.31 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. Dellinger also took and passed her drug-screening test. Id. 
 22. Id. Two employees from Science Applications independently confirmed that Science Applications had 
taken no action regarding her employment application after August 24, 2009. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. In assessing the motion to dismiss, the district court used the United States Supreme Court two-
pronged test from Ashcroft v. Iqbal. Dellinger. 2010 WL 1375263, at *2 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009)). Under the first prong, “a court must identify and reject legal conclusions unsupported by factual 
allegations because they are not entitled to the presumption of truth.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Under 
the second prong, “assuming the veracity of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations,’ a court must conduct a ‘context-
specific’ analysis drawing on ‘its judicial experience and common sense’ and determine whether the factual 
allegations ‘plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 681). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at *3. 
 28. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006)). 
 29. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(g)). To “[s]uffer or permit to work means that if an employer requires or 
allows employees to work, the time spent is generally hours worked.” FLSA Hours Worked Advisor: Suffer or 
Permit to Work, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/hoursworked/screen1d.asp (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2013). 
 30. Dellinger, 2010 WL 1375263, at  *4. 
 31. Id. 
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Dellinger appealed the district court’s ruling to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.32 
II. Legal Background 
In Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corp.,33 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted the FLSA to protect only current and 
former employees from retaliation, not prospective employees or job applicants.34 
Dellinger was the first time that the Fourth Circuit interpreted the FLSA’s anti-
retaliation provision as it relates to prospective employees and job applicants.35 
Additionally, the issue has been litigated in only two cases before Dellinger.36 While 
only two cases before Dellinger had interpreted the FLSA in terms of prospective 
employees, two Fourth Circuit cases prior to Dellinger, applied expansive 
interpretations of “employee” in the FLSA.37 Moreover, cases dealing with Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are also instructive on the issue before the court in 
Dellinger because courts have held in such cases that the term “employee” is 
ambiguous.38 In reaching its conclusion, the Dellinger court interpreted the FLSA 
according to its plain meaning and held that the language of the Act does not 
permit job applicants to bring retaliation claims against prospective employers. 
A. The Language of the FLSA Permits Employees to Bring Claims of Retaliation 
Against Employers 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 regulates the relationship between employees 
and employers to correct and eliminate “the existence, in industries engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions 
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for 
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”39 In order to meet this 
purpose, the FLSA establishes a minimum wage that every employer must pay each 
of its employees,40 as well as maximum hours set at forty hours per week, unless an 
employee “receives compensation . . . at a rate not less than one and one-half times 
the regular rate at which he is employed.”41 Additionally, the FLSA prohibits 
retaliation against employees who bring claims under the FLSA. The Act defines 
 
 32. Dellinger v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 231. 
 35. Id. at 23031. 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
 37. See infra Part II.C. 
 38. See infra Part II.D. 
 39. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 228 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006)). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006). 
 41. Id. § 207(a)(2)(C). 
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“retaliation” as discrimination “against any employee because such employee has 
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or 
related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such 
proceeding.”42 This retaliation provision is designed to protect employees from 
facing reprisal for filing claims against their employers.43 
The FLSA is enforced in three ways: criminal prosecutions,44 private civil actions 
by employees,45 and civil enforcement actions by the Secretary of Labor.46 Under the 
private civil action provision, employees are authorized to sue their employers 
under the minimum wage, maximum hours or retaliation provisions.47 The FLSA 
defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer”48 and an 
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer 
in relation to an employee.”49 
B. Two District Courts Before Dellinger Held that Job Applicants Were Not 
“Employees” Under the Act 
Few courts have construed the FLSA retaliation provision in regards to job 
applicants and prospective employees. Only two district courts before Dellinger 
have addressed the issue, and both courts declined to extend the FLSA retaliation 
provision to job applicants and prospective employees.50 The district courts, 
applying the plain statutory meaning of the Act, preserved retaliation claims for 
current and former employees, but did not extend protection to prospective 
employees.51 Although one of these two cases took place in the Fourth Circuit, both 
cases were district court cases, and thus were not binding precedent on the Dellinger 
court.52 However, because the issue of interpreting the FLSA’s retaliation provision 
in regards to prospective employees was one of first impression in the Fourth 
Circuit, the reasoning from the two district court cases was persuasive in Dellinger. 
 
 42. Id. § 215(a)(3). 
 43. See, e.g., Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 228 (“[T]he FLSA protects these substantive rights by prohibiting 
retaliation . . . .”). 
 44. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (2006). 
 45. See id.§ 216(b). 
 46. See id.§ 216(c). 
 47. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 228 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006)). 
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006). 
 49. Id. § 203(d). 
 50. See Glover v. City of N. Charleston, 942 F. Supp. 243 (D. S.C. 1996); Harper v. San Luis Valley Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., 848 F. Supp. 911 (D. Colo. 1994). 
 51. See Glover, 942 F. Supp. at 247 (“Here, Plaintiffs were job applicants with no prior employment 
relationship with the City. Because Plaintiffs do not meet the requirements for ‘any employee’ under section 
215(a)(3), their FLSA claims should be dismissed.”); Harper, 848 F. Supp. at 914 (“Therefore, other unnamed 
parties such as non-employee job applicants are excluded from [the FLSA’s] protection.”). 
 52. The first case, Harper, took place in the District of Colorado, while the second case, Glover, took place 
in the District of South Carolina, which is in the Fourth Circuit. Glover, 942 F. Supp. 243; Harper, 848 F. Supp. 
at 911. 
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1. In Harper v. San Luis Valley Regional Medical Center, the United States District 
Court of Colorado Held that the Retaliation Provision of the FLSA Did Not Extend to 
Non-employee Job Applicants 
In Harper v. San Luis Valley Regional Medical Center,53 the Plaintiff, Thomas Harper, 
brought an FLSA anti-retaliation claim in the United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado against the Defendants, San Luis Valley Regional Medical 
Center (SLV Medical) and Lutheran Hospital Association.54 Harper claimed that the 
Defendants did not hire him because he had been a party to an FLSA wage claim 
against his preceding employer.55 Harper argued that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation 
provision should be extended to prospective employees and job applicants.56 
However, the court did not accept Harper’s claims.57 
Judge Lewis T. Babcock determined that although courts from other circuits had 
extended rights under Section 215(a)(3) of the FLSA to protect former employees 
from retaliation from former employers, “no court ha[d] addressed whether this 
anti-retaliation statute extends further to protect job applicants who were neither 
former employees nor employees of the retaliating employer.”58 In deciding the 
scope of the FLSA, the Harper court began with the statutory language of the Act.59 
The court reasoned that when a statute names specific parties that fall within its 
provisions, other unnamed parties are precluded.60 Therefore, the court held that 
because the FLSA specifically identifies “employees” as falling within its provisions, 
that all unnamed parties, such as prospective employees and job applicants, are 
precluded from the Act’s protection.61 
In holding that job applicants are not protected against retaliation from 
prospective employers, the Harper court declined to extend protection to 
prospective employees and job applicants.62 
 
 53. Harper, 848 F. Supp. 911. 
 54. Id. at 912. 
 55. Id. In October of 1991, Harper was one of eleven individuals who filed a suit for unpaid overtime wages 
against the City and County of Alamosa. Id. In the spring and early summer of 1992, Harper applied for a 
nursing position at SLV Medical, however he was not hired into one of the available positions. Id. Seven or 
Eight of Harper’s classmates were hired into the available nursing positions at SLV Medical, “notwithstanding 
Harper’s higher class standing, more extensive experience in patient care, mobile intensive care, and teaching 
experience.” Id. Harper claimed that SLV Medical failed to hire him because he had filed an FLSA claim against 
his previous employer and this gave rise to a retaliation claim. Id. at 912, 913. 
 56. Id. at 913. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (“Statutory words mean nothing unless they distinguish one situation from another; line-drawing is 
the business of language.”). 
 60. Id. at 914 (citing Foxgord v. Hischemoeller, 820 F.2d 1030, 1035, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (9th Cir. 
1987)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 915. 
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2. In Glover v. City of North Charleston, the Court Held that While the “Any Person” 
Language of the FLSA Anti-retaliation Provision Does Not Require the Defendant to Be 
the Employer of the Plaintiff, the “Any Employee” Language of the Provision Does 
Require a Current or Past Employment Relationship Between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant 
In Glover v. City of North Charleston,63 Plaintiffs Steven Glover and Kevin Edgmon 
claimed they were retaliated against by a prospective employer.64 Glover and 
Edgmon were employed with the North Charleston District Fire Department until 
March 31, 1996.65 Glover and Edgmon had previously been the lead plaintiffs in two 
separate FLSA wage and hour disputes against the North Charleston District.66 
During the fall of 1995 and early 1996, the fire department, which employed Glover 
and Edgmon, disbanded and the City of North Charleston took over fire protection 
and related services for the North Charleston District.67 The fire department’s 
employees, including Glover and Edgmon, were permitted to apply for positions in 
the newly formed fire department run by the city.68 However, the city decided not to 
hire the Plaintiffs, and subsequently Glover and Edgmon sued, alleging that they 
were not hired by the city in retaliation for filing and participating in their previous 
FLSA claims against the district.69 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming 
that Glover and Edgmon were not the defendants’ employees, and thus were not 
able to maintain a suit under the FLSA.70 
In reaching its decision, the Glover court first looked at the relevant language of 
the anti-retaliation provision: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . to discharge or in any other 
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed 
any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under 
or related to this chapter . . . .71 
The court then looked at the FLSA’s definitions of “any person,” “employee,” 
and “employ.” The FLSA defines “any person” as “an individual, partnership, 
 
 63. 942 F. Supp. 243 (D.S.C. 1996). 
 64. Id. at 244. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 244–245. Glover was the lead plaintiff in an FLSA wage and hour dispute against the North 
Charleston District, while Edgmon was the lead plaintiff in a parallel FLSA wage and hour dispute against the 
North Charleston District and other defendants. Id. 
 67. Id. at 245. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006)) (emphasis in case).  
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association, . . . or any organized group of persons,”72 an “employee” as an 
“individual employed by an employer,” and to “employ” as “to suffer or permit to 
work.”73 The court determined from this language that “any person” meant any 
defendant with or without an employment relationship to the plaintiff, but that 
“employee” mandated that the plaintiff have an employment relationship with the 
defendant.74 
The Glover court ultimately followed the decision in Harper v. San Luis Valley 
Regional Medical Center The Glover court regarded Harper as “one of the few cases, 
if not the only case, to address whether the FLSA anti-retaliation provision extends 
to protect job applicants who are neither former nor current employees of the 
retaliating employer.”75 The Glover court held that the plaintiffs were job applicants 
with no prior employment relationship with the city and thus did not meet the 
requirements for “any employee” under 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).76 Therefore, the 
plaintiffs’ FLSA claims were dismissed.77 
C. In Two Fourth Circuit Cases Prior to Dellinger, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit Applied Expansive Interpretations of “Employee” in the FLSA 
Before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided Dellinger v. Science 
Applications International Corp., the court decided two cases that expanded the 
definition of “employee” within the FLSA: Darveau v. Detecon, Inc.78 and 
McLaughlin v. Ensley.79 Darveau held that former employees were afforded anti-
retaliation protection under the FLSA,80 and Ensley held that workers who only 
attended job orientation were employees within the FLSA.81 
 
 
 
 
 72. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(a)). 
 73. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), (g)). 
 74. Id. The court first examined cases where courts have not required “any person” to be an employer 
under the retaliation provision of the FLSA. Id. (citing Bowe v. Judson C. Burns Inc., 137 F.2d 37, 38 (3d Cir. 
1943); Wirtz v. Ross Packaging Co., 367 F.2d 549, 550 (5th Cir. 1966); Donovan v. Schoolhouse Four, Inc., 573 
F. Supp. 185 (W.D.Va. 1983)). However, when the court looked to cases involving the language “any 
employee,” they found that an employment relationship must exist between the plaintiff and defendant. Glover, 
942 F. Supp. at 246. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 247. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 515 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 79. 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 80. Darveau, 515 F.3d at 343. 
 81. McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1210. 
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1. In Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Expanded 
the Term “Employee” in the FLSA to Include Former Employees 
In Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., the plaintiff, Larry Darveau, worked for Detecon, Inc. 
from 2003 until January 2005.82 At the end of 2004, Detecon, Inc. informed Darveau 
that they would be eliminating his position in the company in the beginning part of 
2005 and that he would be terminated.83 After Darveau’s termination, he entered 
into a “Commission Settlement and Release Agreement,” which provided that 
Darveau would not sue Detecon, Inc. regarding “commission claims” in exchange 
for $50,000.84 However, the agreement did not specify the release from any potential 
FLSA claims.85 In August of 2005, Darveau brought an FLSA claim against Detecon, 
Inc. for unpaid overtime.86 Subsequently, Detecon, Inc. filed an action against 
Darveau alleging breach of contract and constructive fraud that arose during 
Darveau’s employment with Detecon, Inc.87 In response, Darveau amended his 
complaint to include a retaliation claim, alleging that Detecon, Inc.’s subsequent 
filing against Darveau constituted retaliation under the FLSA.88 
While the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit affirmed Detecon, Inc.’s 
motion for summary judgment on the overtime claim,89 the court reversed the 
lower court’s dismissal of Darveau’s retaliation claim.90 The court held that 
Darveau, a former employee of Detecon, Inc. at the time of the claim, was an 
employee within the meaning of the FLSA.91 The court expanded the term 
“employee” to include former employees because former employees, like current 
employees, need FLSA protection against retaliation.92 
2. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in McLaughlin v. Ensley, Held that 
Employees Who Only Attended Job Orientation Were Employees Within the FLSA 
In McLaughlin v. Ensley, Defendant Kirby Ensley ran a snack food distribution 
company that stocked various vending machines.93 Before hiring “route men” to 
drive his company trucks, Ensley required prospective employees to spend 
approximately five days and fifty to sixty hours on a route, performing the everyday 
 
 82. Darveau, 515 F.3d at 337. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. Darveau’s amended complaint also contained a breach of contract claim. Id. 
 89. Id. at 339. 
 90. Id. at 343. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
 93. 877 F.2d 1207, 1208 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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duties of route men.94 Ensley did not compensate the job applicants for work done 
during this time.95 The question for the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was 
whether these uncompensated workers were “employees” within the meaning of the 
FLSA.96 The court held that they were.97 
The Ensley court determined that the proper inquiry was whether Ensley had 
benefitted from the work that that the potential route men had performed during 
their weeklong orientation.98 The court determined that Ensley indeed benefitted 
when the route men performed uncompensated work for him during their 
orientations.99 Additionally, the court found that the benefit that Ensley received 
from having the workers perform the duties of route men while not being 
compensated outweighed any benefit that the workers received in increased skill or 
learning.100 In Ensley, the Fourth Circuit expanded the term “employee” to include a 
group of job applicants, who were not yet employed by their employer. 
D. In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Supreme Court of the United States Held that the 
Term “Employee” Was Ambiguous in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,101 the Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing a 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision, held that the term “employee” in 
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964102 was ambiguous.103 The 
Court also held that the retaliation provision of Section 704 included former 
employees.104 Section 704(a) makes it unlawful to for an employer to discriminate 
against an employee or applicant for employment who has sought Title VII 
protections, or helped other in doing so.105 Although Robinson deals with Title VII 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1209. The Ensley court looked to Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947), and 
Walling v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 330 U.S. 158 (1947), Supreme Court cases that dealt with railroad workers. 
The two cases dealt with the distinction between training that was not covered by the FLSA and employment 
that was covered by the FLSA. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 153; Nashville, 330 U.S. at 158. In Portland 
Terminal, the Court held that an important factor in determining FLSA application is whether the employer 
received an “immediate advantage” and benefitted from the work of the employees. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 
at 153.   
 99. Ensley, 877 F.2d at 1210. Ensley benefitted when the workers drove trucks, unloaded and loaded trucks, 
restocked retail store shelves and vending machines, learned basic food vending machine maintenance, and 
performed simple kinds of paperwork. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 102. Section 704(a) is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).  
 103. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 339. 
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and not the FLSA, the two Acts similarly prohibit 
retaliatory acts against employees.106 
The defendant in Robinson, Shell Oil Co., fired one of its employees, Charles T. 
Robinson, Sr., in 1991.107 Following his termination, Robinson filed a charge with 
the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC), alleging that Shell Oil 
had discharged him because of his race.108 While that charge was pending, Robinson 
applied for a job with a different company.109 The subsequent company that 
Robinson applied to contacted Shell Oil, as Robinson’s former employer, for an 
employment reference.110 Robinson claimed that Shell Oil gave him a negative 
reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge.111 
The Supreme Court began its decision in Robinson by finding that the term 
“employee” in Section 704(a) is ambiguous.112 The Court then moved on to resolve 
the ambiguity of “employee” in the provision.113 The Court stated that Section 
704(a) expressly protects employees from retaliation for filing a charge under Title 
VII, which includes a charge of unlawful discharge.114 The Robinson Court reasoned 
that an unlawful discharge claim would only be brought by a former employee; 
therefore, the Court held that the use of “employee” in Section 704(a) included 
former employees.115 The Court also held that excluding former employees from 
Section 704(a) protection would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII because it 
would allow the threat of postemployment retaliation.116 Therefore, the Supreme 
Court, in reversing the Fourth Circuit’s decision, held that “employee” in Section 
704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was ambiguous, and the Court 
expanded the Act’s coverage to include former employees.117 
III. The Court’s Reasoning 
In Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corp.,118 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia and held that the term “employee” in the FLSA does not 
 
 106. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, with 29 U.S.C. § 215. 
 107. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 339.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 345. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 346. 
 117. Id. 
 118. 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012). 
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include prospective employees.119 Therefore, the court held that job applicants 
cannot bring anti-retaliation claims against prospective employers. 
A. Majority Opinion 
The majority, written by Judge Paul Victor Niemeyer, started its analysis with a 
discussion of the FLSA, including the minimum wage, minimum hour and 
retaliation provisions.120 In looking at the language of the relevant FLSA sections, 
the court concluded that by using the term “employee” in the retaliation provision 
of the FLSA that Congress afforded protection only to those who were in an 
employment relationship with their employers.121 Primarily, the majority looked at 
the language of Section 216(b), which states that an employer who violates Section 
215(a)(3) (the anti-retaliation provision) is liable for legal and equitable remedies. 
In looking at the language of 215(a)(3), the court determined, “[w]hile § 215(a)(3) 
does prohibit all ‘persons’ from engaging in certain acts, including retaliation 
against employees, it does not authorize employees to sue ‘any person.’”122 
Therefore, the court concluded that Section 215(a)(3) only permits remedies for 
violations by an employer and since Dellinger could not prove Science Applications 
was her employer, she did not have standing to sue under the Act.123 
In reaching its opinion, the majority relied on the fact that Dellinger had not 
brought an FLSA claim of retaliation against her current or former employer; 
instead, she brought one against her prospective employer.124 Dellinger never had an 
employment relationship with Science Applications.125 The court held that in order 
to be consistent with the purpose of the FLSA, to regulate employer-employee 
relations, only current and former employees could sue under the retaliation 
provision of the FLSA, not job applicants.126 
Although the court was “sympathetic” to Dellinger’s claims, it was unable to 
broaden the scope of the Act beyond the plain language of the statute, “even when 
‘morally unacceptable retaliatory conduct’ may be involved.”127 The majority 
 
 119. Id. at 231. 
 120. Id. at 228. 
 121. Id. First, the court looked to Section 215(a)(3) of the Act, which prohibits retaliation against an 
“employee” and Section 203(e)(1), which defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” Id. 
at 228–29 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)). The court then looked at the language of 
Section 216(b) of the Act which provides for employees’ right to civil litigation. Id. at 229. Section 216(b) 
provides that an employee may sue his employer for violations under the Act, including retaliation claims. Id. 
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 228. 
 125. Id. (“In this case, Dellinger has not sued her employer, but rather a prospective employer, for 
retaliation.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 230–31 (quoting Ball v. Memphis Bar–B–Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
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concluded its opinion with a quick disposal of Dellinger’s argument that the FLSA’s 
definition of “employee” should be extended to be more consistent with other 
statutes, such as the Energy Reorganization Act, the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and the Pipeline Safety 
Improvement Act.128 
B. The Dissent 
Judge Robert Bruce King dissented from the majority, relying on Robinson v. Shell 
Oil Co., a United States Supreme Court case.129 Although Robinson involved a 
former employee rather than a prospective employee, Judge King likened Dellinger 
to Robinson.130 Judge King stated that the majority, in failing to address Robinson, 
gave a “thumbs-up” Science Application’s conduct and paved the way for other 
employers to adopt similar retaliatory practices.131 Judge King also compared 
Dellinger to Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., which expanded the term “employee” in the 
anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA to include former employees under the 
FLSA.132 
Judge King argued that it would not have been a stretch for the Dellinger court to 
expand the FLSA’s definition of “employee” to permit Dellinger’s claim because 
other similar remedial statutes have been applied to prospective employees and job 
applicants.133 In his dissent, Judge King opposed the majority’s stance on the 
inapplicability of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to Dellinger’s situation.134 Unlike the 
majority in Dellinger, Judge King determined that these Acts support broadening 
the definition of “employee” in the FLSA to include job applicants and prospective 
employees.135 
Judge King also argued that the majority overlooked McLaughlin v. Ensley, which 
“opened the door” to a less restrictive interpretation of “employee” under the 
 
 128. Id. at 231. The court held that the Energy Reorganization Act case cited by Dellinger merely assumed, 
without deciding, that an applicant was covered under that Act. Id. (citing Doyle v. Secretary of Labor, 285 F.3d 
243, 251 n. 13 (3d Cir. 2002)). Further, the court held that although the NLRA protects prospective employees 
from retaliation, “the Act itself defines ‘employee’ more broadly than does the FLSA, providing that the term 
‘employee’ ‘shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer’ unless explicitly stated.” Id. (quoting 
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)). In regards to OSHA and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, the court held that 
the regulations implementing those statutes were explicitly promulgated to extend protections to prospective 
employees. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(b) (2013) (OSHA); 29 C.F.R. § 1981.101 (Pipeline Safety 
Improvement Act)). The court concluded by stating that the Secretary of Labor has not promulgated a similar 
regulation for the FLSA. Id. 
 129. Id. at 231 (King, J. dissenting ) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 232. 
 132. Id. at 233 (citing Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
 133. Id. at 234. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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FLSA.136 In Ensley, the Fourth Circuit held that an employer’s uncompensated 
trainees were employees under the FLSA and were entitled to minimum wage 
payments, even though they were not officially hired until successfully completing 
the training.137 Judge King reasoned that Dellinger was in the same position as the 
trainees in Ensley because, like the trainees in Ensley, “[t]here was no legitimate 
impediment between her and the imminent assumption of her job duties.”138 Judge 
King concluded that Dellinger was an employee within the meaning of the FLSA 
and that she had made a legally sufficient claim against Science Applications.139 
IV. Analysis 
In Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corp.,140 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a job applicant is not an “employee” under 
the FLSA.141 In so holding, the majority in Dellinger relied too heavily on the strict 
statutory language of the FLSA, and missed an opportunity to expand the meaning 
of “employee” under the Act to allow job applicants to bring anti-retaliation claims 
against prospective employers. The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA was 
intended to protect workers — including former, current, and prospective 
employees — from negative reprisals as a result of filing FLSA claims.142 By not 
affording prospective employees the same protection as former and current 
employees, the Dellinger court failed to uphold the purpose of the anti-retaliation 
provision of the Act. A “policy that is undermined when an employer fires a current 
employee is also undermined when a subsequent employer refuses to hire the same 
person.”143 In Dellinger, the Fourth Circuit permitted the kind of retaliatory 
behavior that the FLSA was designed to prevent.144 
By overlooking Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit cases that have expanded the 
term “employee,” the Dellinger court failed to correctly apply precedent to the 
 
 136. Id. at 236 (citing McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
 137. Id. (citing McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1210). 
 138. Id. at 237. 
 139. Id. 
 140. 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012). 
 141. Id. at 231. 
 142. See, e.g., Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1549 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The purpose of § 15(a)(3) is not merely to 
vindicate the rights of complaining parties, but to foster an environment in which employees are unfettered in 
their decision to voice grievances without ‘fear of economic retaliation,’ . . . or reprisal.”); Dunlop v. Carriage 
Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1977) (“Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was 
enacted by Congress to remove the risk of employer retaliation against efforts by employees to secure their ‘just 
wage deserts under the Act.’” (citations omitted)). 
 143. Mark A. Rothstein, Wrongful Refusal to Hire: Attaching the Other Half of the Employment-at-Will Rule, 
24 CONN. L. REV. 97, 120 (1991).  
 144. See Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 343 (4th Cir. 2008) (the FLSA’s purpose is “to secure [its] 
substantive protections ‘by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s 
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.’” (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006))). 
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question of whether a job applicant is an employee within the FLSA. Based on FLSA 
and Title VII precedent, the majority in Dellinger should have found that the term 
“employee” in the FLSA is ambiguous.145 Additionally, the Dellinger court 
overlooked the fact that the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA provide that it is 
unlawful for “any person,” not “any employer,” to retaliate against an employee for 
making an FLSA claim.146 Finally, the court should have compared Dellinger’s 
claims to similar federal remedial statutes that provide protection to prospective 
employees and job applicants.147 The Fourth Circuit should have safeguarded 
employees’ rights under the retaliation provision of the FLSA by expanding 
“employee” to include job applicants and prospective employees. 
A. The Term “Employee” Is Ambiguous in the FLSA 
In the Dellinger dissent, Judge King correctly found that the term “employee” in the 
FLSA is ambiguous,148 just as the Supreme Court of the United States found that 
“employee” is ambiguous in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co.149 Although Robinson dealt with Title VII and not the FLSA, both 
statutes have employee anti-retaliation provisions.150 Additionally, the Fourth 
Circuit previously acknowledged the relevance of Title VII precedent to cases 
involving the FLSA.151 
1. The Dellinger Court Should Have Looked to Title VII Case Law in Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co. to Determine that the Term “Employee” Is Ambiguous in the FLSA 
The majority in Dellinger should have determined that the term “employee” in the 
FLSA is ambiguous.152 In finding that the term employee is unambiguous in the 
FLSA, the majority overlooked the statutory construction set forth in Robinson, 
which is seen by some as “the definitive authority on statutory construction.”153 In 
Robinson, the Supreme Court found “employee” to be ambiguous in the context of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.154 Although Robison dealt with Title VII and 
not the FLSA, the Robinson opinion should have been used to inform the majority’s 
analysis in Dellinger because the Robinson opinion readily admits a more widely 
 
 145. See infra Part IV.A. 
 146. See infra Part IV.B. 
 147. See infra Part IV.C. 
 148. Dellinger v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 649 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2011) (King, J., dissenting). 
 149. 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
 150. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006), with 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
 151. Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Of particular note here, we and other 
courts have looked to Title VII cases in interpreting the FLSA.”). 
 152. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 233 (King, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 231. 
 154. Id. at 232 (citing Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341). 
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reaching application to other federal statutes, such as the FLSA.155 Following the 
analysis of “employee” in Robinson, the use of “employee” in the FLSA is also 
ambiguous.156 
The Robinson Court concluded that the term “employee,” as used in Title VII, 
was ambiguous for three reasons.157 For these same three reasons, the use of 
“employee” in the FLSA is also ambiguous. First, the Robinson court concluded that 
the term “employee” in Title VII did not have a temporal qualifier to indicate 
whether it applied to current or former employees.158 Similarly, “employee,” as it 
appears in Section 215 of the FLSA, does not have a temporal qualifier.159 The 
statute only prohibits retaliating against “any employee.”160 Following the logic from 
Robinson, “employee” in the FLSA could include a prospective employee or job 
applicant. 
Second, the Robinson Court held that Title VII’s prescribed definition of 
employee also contained no temporal qualifier.161 The act defines an employee as 
“an individual employed by an employer . . . .”162 Therefore, the definition of 
“employee” in Title VII could include current or former employees. Equally, the 
FLSA’s definition of “employee” does not contain a temporal qualifier.163 The FLSA 
defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer,” without any 
reference to when the employee was or will be employed.164 Consequently, this 
definition of “employee” could include an employee who is to be employed in the 
future, such as a prospective employee or job applicant. 
Finally, the Robinson Court held that the listed remedies of Title VII include 
“reinstatement” and “hiring,” signaling that the use of employees in Title VII mean 
something more than just current employees.165 Both “reinstatement” and “hiring” 
indicate an expansion beyond just current employees because an employer cannot 
reinstate or hire someone who is currently working for him.166 Therefore, these Title 
VII remedies implicitly apply to former employees who desire reinstatement and 
prospective employees who desire to be hired. Similarly, among the specific 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 233. 
 157. Id. at 232. 
 158. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“But nowhere in Title VII is either phrase 
[‘current employee’ or ‘former employee’] used . . . .”). 
 159. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . to discharge or in any other 
manner discriminate against any employee . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 160. Id.  
 161. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341. 
 162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 
 163. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342. 
 166. Id. 
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remedies for retaliatory acts in the FLSA are “employment” and “reinstatement.”167 
Like the remedies listed in Title VII, both of these terms provide for an expansive 
interpretation of “employee” beyond current employees. Specifically, Section 216’s 
remedy of “employment” seems to reference prospective employees and job 
applicants. A current employee would not seek employment as a remedy because he 
is already employed, but someone who has yet to be employed, such as a job 
applicant, would seek employment as a remedy for retaliation.168 
Based on the analysis of “employee” as an ambiguous term in Title VII in 
Robinson, the Dellinger court should have found “employee” to be equally 
ambiguous in the FLSA. The term “employee” is ambiguous in the anti-retaliation 
provision of the FLSA because it lacks a temporal quality and it implicitly referred 
to prospective employees.169 
2. In Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., the Fourth Circuit Had Previously Applied a More 
Expansive Definition of “Employee” to Include Former Employees 
In Darveau v. Detecon, Inc.,170 a case involving an FLSA retaliation claim, the Fourth 
Circuit permitted an expansive interpretation of the term “employee” to include 
former employees.171 Although the Darveau court did not expressly state that the use 
of “employee” in the FLSA was ambiguous, the court could not have expanded the 
FLSA’s use of “employee” to include former employees without first acknowledging 
that the term was ambiguous.172 In Darveau, the Fourth Circuit relied on Robinson v. 
Shell Oil, Co., a Title VII case which the majority declined to visit in its opinion in 
Dellinger.173 By following Robinson, the Fourth Circuit, in Darveau, relied on Title 
VII precedent to expand the definition of “employee” in the FLSA to include former 
employees.174 Using the same analysis, the Fourth Circuit, in Dellinger, should have 
 
 167. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“Any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be 
liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of Section 215(a)(3) of 
this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost . . . 
.” (emphasis added)).  
 168. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342 (“[O]ne may hire individuals to be employees, but one does not typically 
hire persons who already are employees.” (emphasis in original)). 
 169. Dellinger v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 649 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 2011) (King, J., dissenting). 
 170. 515 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 171. Id. at 342. 
 172. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 233 (King, J., dissenting). 
 173. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 232 (King, J., dissenting) (“The majority affirms with no discussion of Robinson 
or its established methodology . . . .”). 
 174. Darveau, 515 F.3d at 342. Before reaching its opinion in Dellinger, the Fourth Circuit “acknowledged 
‘the almost uniform practice of courts in considering the authoritative body of Title VII case law when 
interpreting the comparable provisions of other federal statutes.’” Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 23233 (quoting 
Darveau, 515 F.3d at 342). The definitions of “employee” are almost identical in Title VII and the FLSA. Id. at 
233 (citing Darveau, 515 F.3d at 342). The FLSA defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an 
employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006). Title VII defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an 
employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 
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expanded the FLSA definition of “employee” to include prospective employees and 
job applicants. 
In Darveau, the court set forth the standard for alleging a retaliation claim under 
the FLSA: a plaintiff only has to allege that his employer retaliated against him by 
engaging in an adverse action that would be “materially adverse to a reasonable 
employee” because the “employer’s actions . . . could well dissuade a reasonable 
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”175 Following this 
Fourth Circuit precedent, the court in Dellinger should have held that Science 
Application’s refusal to hire Dellinger was retaliation. Science Applications’s 
withdrawal of its offer of employment to Dellinger because she had previously filed 
an FLSA claim would be materially adverse to a reasonable employee. A reasonable 
employee would not want their job offer revoked because of a prior, unrelated act. 
Additionally, permitting retaliatory actions from prospective employers, such as 
Science Applications’s actions in Dellinger, could dissuade employees from making 
charges of discrimination for fear that their previous employers will say something 
negative about them to prospective employers and prevent them from seeking new 
employment. Therefore, under the standard set forth in Darveau, the Dellinger 
court should have found that Dellinger made a valid claim of retaliation against 
Science Applications. 
The court in Darveau, in expanding FLSA retaliation protection to former 
employees, specifically addressed the problem faced by Dellinger. The Darveau 
court stated that former employees require protection “because they often need 
references from past employers, [and] they may face retaliation from new employers 
who learn they have challenged the labor practices of previous employers . . . .”176 
However, the Dellinger majority did not follow the precedent set forth in Darveau 
and did not provide protection for employees who face retaliation from new 
employers, like Dellinger. 
Even though Title VII and the FLSA seek to combat separate workplace issues, 
the purposes of the two provisions are the same: “to secure their substantive 
protections ‘by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with 
an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic 
guarantees.’”177 In order to further this purpose, the Fourth Circuit, in Dellinger, 
should have expanded the term employee to include prospective employees because 
prospective employees, like current and former employees, need protection from 
retaliation.178 The Dellinger court, by refusing to expand the term “employee” in the 
FLSA to include job applicants and prospective employees, permitted the kind of 
 
 175. Darveau, 515 F.3d at 343 (citations omitted). 
 176. Id. (emphasis added). 
 177. Id. at 342 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006)). 
 178. Id. at 343 (holding employees may face retaliation from prospective employers who learn of past FLSA 
claims). 
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retaliatory behavior from Science Applications that the FLSA was directed at 
preventing. 
B. Judge King Correctly Looked to Sections 215(a)(1) Through (3) of the FLSA, Which 
Specifically State That It Is Unlawful for “Any Person,” Not “Any Employer” to 
Retaliate Against an Employee Who Has Filed an FLSA Claim. 
The language of Sections 215(a)(1) through (3) of the FLSA specifically prohibits 
“any person” from discharging or discriminating against an employee for filing an 
FLSA claim.179 The Act’s use of the words “any person” instead of “any employer” 
opens the door for expanding the retaliation provision beyond just current 
employer-employee relationships because “any person” does not necessarily include 
employers.180 The court should have expanded the anti-retaliation provisions of the 
FLSA to prospective employees and job applicants because the statute’s use of “any 
person” instead of “any employer.” 
A plain reading of the FLSA reveals that Congress was concerned enough with 
retaliation that it imposed penalties on actual decisionmakers (“any person”) and 
not just employers.181 Section 216 of the FLSA provides for criminal and civil 
penalties for violations of the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions.182 Section 216(a) 
provides for criminal penalties against “any person” who willfully violates the anti-
retaliation provision of the FLSA.183 This language implies Congress’s intent to hold 
anyone criminally responsible who violates the anti-retaliation provision of the 
FLSA.184 Even though “any person” only appears in the criminal penalties provision 
of the FLSA, a plain reading of the civil liabilities provision would also permit 
Dellinger’s claim against Science Applications. 
The civil liabilities under Section 216 apply to “any employer” against an 
“employee or employees,” not “any person.”185 However, this language does not 
preclude the FLSA’s application to Dellinger. The Dellinger majority, in reaching its 
decision, overlooked the fact that Science Applications is an employer and Dellinger 
is an employee under the FLSA. Science Applications is an employer who is subject 
to the FLSA, as evidenced by its offer of employment to Dellinger.186 Only an 
employer can make an offer of employment. Further, Science Applications fits into 
the definition of an employer under the FLSA. The FLSA defines an employer as 
 
 179. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (2006) (“After the expiration of one hundred and twenty days from June 25, 1938, it 
shall be unlawful for any person . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 180. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 234 (King, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. 
 182. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a)–(c). 
 183. Id. § 216(a). 
 184. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 234 (King, J., dissenting). 
 185. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 186. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 234 (King, J., dissenting). 
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“any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to 
an employee.”187 Science Applications is an employer who acted in relation to 
Dellinger, who is an employee. The Act does not require the employer to be acting 
against his employee, just “an employee.”188 Additionally, Dellinger is an employee 
under the FLSA. Dellinger had previously qualified as an employee under the Act 
when she made her charge against her prior employer.189 She did not lose her status 
as an employee under the Act when she applied to Science Applications. Therefore, 
the majority in Dellinger erred by not allowing Dellinger to sue Science Applications 
under the Act because she could not prove that Science Application was ever her 
employer.190 
The Dellinger dissent rightly begged the question why “in the face of a statute’s 
relative silence as to a material enforcement term, [the court] must presume that a 
particular avenue is foreclosed because it is not explicitly mentioned, rather than 
permitted because it is not specifically prohibited.”191 The majority declined to 
extend FLSA protection to prospective employees because it was not explicitly 
permitted in the Act, instead of extending protection to prospective employees 
because such protection is not specifically prohibited in the Act.192 The majority’s 
decision in Dellinger regresses from Robinson, which called for a move toward an 
expansive interpretation of protective statutes like Title VII and the FLSA to cease 
employer retaliation.193 The majority in Dellinger overlooked the use of “any 
person” in Section 215 of the FLSA in enforcing liability to Science Applications 
under the Act. Further, the majority erred by not finding that Science Applications 
and Dellinger were an employer and employee under the FLSA, respectively. 
C. The Dellinger Court Should Have Compared Dellinger’s Claims to Similar Federal 
Remedial Statutes that Already Apply to Prospective Employees and Job Applicants 
Two other major federal employment statutes include a retaliation provision: the 
National Labor Relations Act194 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act.195 The 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) defines the term “employee” to “include any 
employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer.”196 
 
 187. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 234 (King, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 235 (“[F]aced with two reasonable and conflicting interpretations, [an act] should be interpreted 
to further its remedial purpose.” (quoting Healy Tibbitts Builders, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 444 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006))). 
 192. Id. at 229 (majority opinion). 
 193. Id. at 235 (King, J., dissenting). 
 194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
 195. Id. § 651. 
 196. Id. § 152(3). 
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Thus, the definition of “employee” in the NLRA permits prospective employees and 
job applicants to bring retaliation claims.197 The Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA) defines “employee” as “an employee of an employer who is employed in a 
business of his employer which affects commerce.”198 While the NLRA definition is 
more inclusive than the definition of employee provided in the FLSA, OSHA’s 
definition of employee arguably is narrower.199 Notwithstanding this, the 
regulations implementing OSHA have specifically construed that the statute affords 
court access to prospective employees and job applicants.200 In light of these two 
similar federal employment regulations that permit prospective employees to bring 
retaliation claims, it would not have been a stretch for the Dellinger court to expand 
the meaning of “employee” in the FLSA to include prospective employees and job 
applicants.201 
The Dellinger majority incorrectly found the comparisons between the FLSA and 
the NLRA and OSHA unpersuasive.202 The majority found that absent similar 
detailed language in the FLSA’s definition of “employee,” comparable to the 
language in the NLRA and OSHA regulation, that Congress intended to make the 
definition of “employee” under the FLSA more restrictive.203 In dismissing the 
importance of comparing the FLSA with OSHA, which specifically allows for job 
applicants to make claims of retaliation, the majority in Dellinger superficially relied 
on the argument that the “Secretary of Labor has not, however, promulgated a 
similar regulation for the FLSA.”204 While this is a true sentiment, the majority’s 
holding represents an unnecessary return to “original intent” methodology.205 
The majority in Dellinger dismissed the applicability of the NLRA and OSHA to 
the construction of “employee” within the FLSA.206 In doing so, the Dellinger court 
ignored the “vital role that antiretaliation provisions play in regulating a vast range 
of undesirable behaviors on the part of employers”207 and permitted Science 
Applications to conduct retaliatory activity that the FLSA was designed to prevent. 
 
 
 
 197. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 98 (1995) (holding that the term “employees” in 
the National Labor Relations Act applies to prospective employees who were paid union organizers). 
 198. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6). 
 199. Section 203(e)(1) of the FLSA defines employee as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 
U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
 200. Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 234 (King, J., dissenting) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(b) (2013)). 
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 207. Id. at 236 (King, J., dissenting). 
 Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corporation 
22 Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy 
V. Conclusion 
In Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corp., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided whether a job applicant is an “employee” 
under the FLSA.208 The court incorrectly held that the FLSA anti-retaliation 
provision does not authorize prospective employees to bring claims against 
prospective employers.209 In reaching this result, the court narrowly defined the 
FLSA’s use of “employee” in the Act to omit prospective employees and job 
applicants.210 The majority’s opinion in Dellinger permitted the kind of retaliatory 
behavior that the FLSA was aimed at preventing.211 The court should have found 
that the term “employee” in the FLSA is ambiguous.212 Further, the majority 
overlooked the fact that the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA state that it is 
unlawful for “any person,” not “any employer” to retaliate against an employee who 
has filed an FLSA claim.213 Finally, when looking at Dellinger’s retaliation claims, the 
Dellinger court should have applied the analysis of similar remedial federal statutes 
that afford protection for employees in situations similar to Dellinger’s.214 The 
Dellinger court missed an opportunity to expand the meaning of “employee” in the 
FLSA to include prospective employees and to hold that the anti-retaliation 
provisions of the FLSA regulate the behaviors of all employers, including 
prospective employers. 
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